, Panel A, going from a fully uncontrolled regression of performance on centrality, to the fully controlled fixed effect models reported in the paper. Panel B displays the results from the Oster (2016) test. Results for the uncontrolled model correspond to Columns one, six and eleven for 1-day, 5-day and 10-day performance, respectively. Results for the controlled model correspond to Columns 5, 10 and 15 for 1-day, 5-day and 10-day performance, respectively. The bias-adjusted coefficients in Columns 3-5 are estimated for three different degrees of selection. Column 6 gives the degree of selection on unobservables in order to give 0. As recommended in the original paper by Oster (2016) , in computing the test statistic, we assume max 2.2 , 1 , where is the R-squared from the controlled regression. Robust standard errors are clustered at the manager-month level. Asterisks denote significance levels (***=1%, **=5%, *=10%).
Panel A. Baseline specifications without controls.
Panel B. Oster (2016) test for different δ.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Eig. Centrality 0.619*** 0.659*** 0.892*** 0.614*** 0.555*** 1.275*** 1.310*** 1.847*** 1.359*** 1.294*** 1.480*** 1.532*** 2.147*** 1.434*** 1.619*** This table regress the value-weighted trading performance at different time horizons (in basis points) on our centrality measures. Our database is collapsed at the broker/manager/month level; we include additional controls with respect to the baseline regression: a proxy for the strength of the relationship between the manager and the broker intermediating the trade (Relationship Strength) ; the number of different clients of the broker (Number of Clients); a proxy of activeness of the brokers' clients, computed as the ratio of dollar volume traded by each client around earnings announcements on total volume, then averaged (volume weighting) across all the broker's clients (Client Activeness); number of hedge funds that are clients of the broker (Number of Hedge Funds Clients); client concentration of the broker, computed as the normalized Herfindahl Index of the volumes traded by each client (Adjusted Client Concentration); volume-weighted average of the centrality of the broker's clients -the centrality of the clients is computed as the Eigenvector Centrality of the broker, but without taking into account the strength of the link between traders and brokers (Client Centrality). All the measures are computed in a window of six months before the trade. T-stats based on robust standard errors, double-clustered at both the month and the manager level, are reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels (***=1%, **=5%, *=10%).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Eig. Centrality 0.598*** 0.509*** 0. (2) and (6) present the results when we replace the actual execution price with the opening price of the day to compute the trading performance; in Columns (3) and (7) we use the value-weighted average daily price as a replacement and in Columns (4) and (8) we use the closing price of the day. Our database here is collapsed at the broker/manager/stock/month level, thus we are able to add manager/stock/time fixed effects. We include as a control the natural logarithm of the dollar trade volume intermediated by each broker in the last six months and the average dollar volume traded (in the stock) by the manager with the broker in the month in which performance is assessed. The centrality measure is standardized to mean zero, unit variance. T-stats based on robust standard errors, double-clustered at both the month and the manager level, are reported in parentheses. We report the results of a Chow test for the difference between the performance computed with the execution price and each one of the alternatives. Asterisks denote significance levels (***=1%, **=5%, *=10%).
(1) This table regresses the value-weighted trading performance at different time horizons (in basis points) on alternative centrality measures. We include as a control the natural logarithm of the dollar trade volume intermediated by each broker in the last six months and the average dollar volume traded (in the stock) by the manager with the broker in the month in which performance is assessed. In Columns 1-3, the main independent variable is degree centrality. In Columns 4-12, the main independent variable is Katz-Bonacich centrality with increasing value of the decay parameter: in 4-6 it is set to 25% of its maximum value; for 7-9, it is set to 50% and for 10-12, it is set to 75%. The centrality measures are standardized to mean zero, unit variance. T-stats based on robust standard errors, double clustered at both the month and the manager level, are reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels (***=1%, **=5%, *=10%).
(1) This table relates the probability of a positive return over five trading days (the dependent variable) for a manager (who is required to be an Hedge Fund) executing a large net volume with a specific broker on a stock, with respect to non-large net volume executions. Large net volumes over a five trading days window are captured by the dummy variable Large Trade and are defined as net volumes (i.e. imbalances) larger or equal than the 75th percentile (or the 90th percentile) of the imbalances distribution estimated in the previous six months. All the imbalances are scaled by the trading volume in CRSP. We include as a control the natural logarithm of the market capitalization and the Amihud illiquidity measure for the stock, estimated over the previous twelve months. T-stats are reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels (***=1%, **=5%, *=10%).
(1) (2) (3) This table relates the probability that a manager will add or sever a relationship with a broker with marketlevel conditions and manager performance. The dependent variable in Columns 1-3 is a dummy taking a value of 1 if a broker has added broker(s) relative to the previous month. In Columns 4-6 it is a dummy taking a value of 1 if the manager has dropped broker(s) relative to the previous month. We include as explanatory variables a dummy taking a value of one if the average VIX index for that month is in the top quartile relative to all other months, the monthly return on the S&P 500 and the manager's performance in the quarter previous. Continuous explanatory variables are standardized to mean zero, unit variance. Standard errors are clustered at the manager-year level. T-stats are reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels (***=1%, **=5%, *=10%).
( Table 5 , Panel B, but with proxies for manager similarity interacted with the time period dummies. For each manager in each month, we aggregate the volume intermediated with each broker over the six previous months, focusing on the 30 most central brokers for that month, and construct a vector of manager-broker intermediated volume. Then, for each big trade, we compute each follower's Euclidian distance and correlation from the big trade originator, using the manager-broker vectors. Euclidian distance is increasing in dissimilarity, so we first divide the distances from each originator by the largest distance for that originator in that month, change the sign and then add one, so that the measure is equal to zero for the most dissimilar manager and 1 for the originator herself. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the follower is trading in the same direction as the originator. In Columns 1-3, the time dummies are interacted with Euclidian distance; in Columns 4-6, they are interacted with correlation. T-stats based on robust standard errors, double-clustered at both the month and the manager level, are reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels (***=1%, **=5%, *=10%).
( We restrict attention to stocks that have been above the median of trading volume for the originator in the previous six months and in the bottom decile for the followers. We divide the sample in three sub-periods: the two trading weeks preceding the week in which the large trade was made (before); the period in which the large trade has started, but the originator is still trading in the same direction at a sustained pace (competition); and the period after the originator has stopped trading, up to four weeks after the large trade week in which he initiated the trade sequence (week 1 to 4). When we refer to week one after the large trade, we identify the period that ranges from end of the competition period to the end of the first week after the large trade week; in a similar way, when we refer to week two to four. In the first three Columns, the dependent variable is a dummy that takes value one if the follower trades in the same direction as the originator, while in Columns 4-6 it is the log of the net dollar volume of the followers. Panel B reports the same specification but interacting the time dummies with the centrality measure. We include as a control the natural logarithm of the dollar trade volume intermediated by each broker in the last six months and the natural logarithm of the large trade volume, taken in absolute value (as before, scaled by the trading volume in CRSP). The centrality measure is standardized to mean zero, unit variance. The most conservative specifications include stock-time and manager-time fixed effects. Panels C-D and E-F report similar specifications, focusing on different sub-samples of usual and unusual. For Panels C-D, we restrict attention to stocks that have been above the median of trading volume for both the originator and the follower (i.e. usual-usual). For Panels E-F, we restrict attention to stocks that have been in the bottom decile of trading volume for the originator and above median for the follower (i.e. unusual-usual). T-stats based on robust standard errors, double-clustered at both the month and the manager level, are reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels (***=1%, **=5%, *=10%).
Panel A: Usual for the Originator, Unusual for the followers Table for different cuts based on manager size, trade size and relative importance of the trade to the manager. In Panel A, we focus on the sub-sample of big trades for which the originator's average trade size, measured over the six months leading up to the month of the big trade, is above median across managers, for that month. We further limit the sample to big trades, as a share of daily dollar volume traded on the stock, are in the top quartile of big trades for that month. As the definition of a big trade is that it comes from the top quartile of the distribution for the originator, this is an implicit cut. In Panel B, we focus on the sub-sample of big trades for which the originator's average trade size over the past six months is below median across managers, for that month. We further limit the sample to big trades as a share of daily volume that are from the bottom quartile of big trades for that month. Finally, as the definition of a big trade is that it comes from the top quartile of the distribution for the originator, this is an implicit cut. Columns 1-3 correspond to Table 5 , Panel A. Columns 4-6 correspond to Table 5 , Panel B. The centrality measure is standardized to mean zero, unit variance. T-stats based on robust standard errors, double-clustered at both the month and the manager level, are reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels (***=1%, **=5%, *=10%).
Panel A. Trades by Large Managers
(1) This table relates the trading behavior of followers after a large trade. In this case we exclude large trades initiated during a window of four weeks (two weeks before and two weeks after) around earnings announcements or changes in analyst recommendations. As before, the followers are all the managers, different from the one who generates the large trade (i.e. the originator), who trade the stock with the same broker who intermediates the large trade. We divide the sample in three sub-periods: the two trading weeks preceding the week in which the large trade was made (before); the period in which the large trade has started, but the originator is still trading in the same direction at a sustained pace (competition); and the period after the originator has stopped trading, up to four weeks after the large trade week in which he initiated the trade sequence (week 1 to 4). When we refer to week one after the large trade, we identify the period that ranges from end of the competition period to the end of the first week after the large trade week; in a similar way, when we refer to week two to four. In the first two Columns, the dependent variable is a dummy that takes value one if the follower trades in the same direction as the originator and zero otherwise, while in Columns 3-4 it is the log of the net dollar volume of the followers. Panel B reports the same specification but interacting the time dummies with the centrality measure. The centrality measure is standardized to unit variance in these regressions. We include as a control the natural logarithm of the dollar trade volume intermediated by each broker in the last six months and the natural logarithm of the large trade volume, taken in absolute value (as before, scaled by the trading volume in CRSP). The most conservative specifications include stock-time and manager-time fixed effects. T-stats based on robust standard errors, double-clustered at both the month and the manager level, are reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels (***=1%, **=5%, *=10%). This table relates the trading behavior of followers after a large trade. In this case we exclude large trades on stocks for which the broker has analyst coverage. Specifically, we exclude any stock for which an analyst at a broker has ever logged an earnings forecast. As before, the followers are all the managers, different from the one who generates the large trade (i.e. the originator), who trade the stock with the same broker who intermediates the large trade. We divide the sample in three sub-periods: the two trading weeks preceding the week in which the large trade was made (before); the period in which the large trade has started, but the originator is still trading in the same direction at a sustained pace (competition); and the period after the originator has stopped trading, up to four weeks after the large trade week in which he initiated the trade sequence (week 1 to 4). When we refer to week one after the large trade, we identify the period that ranges from end of the competition period to the end of the first week after the large trade week; in a similar way, when we refer to week two to four. In the first two Columns, the dependent variable is a dummy that takes value one if the follower trades in the same direction as the originator and zero otherwise, while in Columns 3-4 it is the log of the net dollar volume of the followers. Panel B reports the same specification but interacting the time dummies with the centrality measure. The centrality measure is standardized to unit variance in these regressions. We include as a control the natural logarithm of the dollar trade volume intermediated by each broker in the last six months and the natural logarithm of the large trade volume, taken in absolute value (as before, scaled by the trading volume in CRSP). The most conservative specifications include stock-time and manager-time fixed effects. T-stats based on robust standard errors, double-clustered at both the month and the manager level, are reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels (***=1%, **=5%, *=10%). In the second placebo test (Panel C and D) , instead, we keep the original timeline without any shift, but in this case we analyze the trading behavior of followers when trading with brokers different from the one who intermediated the large trade. Our definition of follower does not change from the usual one, therefore the composition of the followers group is unchanged. The structure of both tests is still the same that we adopt in the baseline analysis. We divide the sample in three sub-periods: the two trading weeks preceding the (shifted) large trade week (before); the (shifted) large trade week (competition); and the period up to four weeks after the (shifted) large trade week (week 1 to 4). In the first two Columns, the dependent variable is a dummy that takes value one if the follower trades in the same direction as the originator and zero otherwise, while in Columns 3-4 it is the log of the net dollar volume of the followers. The centrality measure is standardized to unit variance in these regressions. We include as a control the natural logarithm of the dollar trade volume intermediated by each broker in the last six months and the natural logarithm of the large trade volume, taken in absolute value (as before, scaled by the trading volume in CRSP). The most conservative specifications include stock-time and manager-time fixed effects. T-stats based on robust standard errors, double-clustered at both the month and the manager level, are reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels (***=1%, **=5%, *=10%).
Panel A: Timeline Shift This table relates the trading behavior of followers after a large trade. We split the sample between large trades for which the originator and the broker intermediating the trade are affiliated, i.e. they belong to the same financial conglomerate, and large trades for which this is not true. We further split each of these two sub-sample in two parts: large trades intermediated by central brokers (centrality above the median) and large trades intermediated by peripheral brokers (centrality below the median). The structure of the tests is the same as in Panel A of Table 5 . In Panel A the dependent variable is a dummy that takes value one if the follower trades in the same direction as the originator and zero otherwise; in Panel B it is the log of the net dollar volume of the followers multiplied by the sign of the trading direction. T-stats based on robust standard errors, double-clustered at both the month and the manager level, are reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels (***=1%, **=5%, *=10%). To construct probabilities of being a follower or originator within a manager-broker pair, we designate as club members managers who have been both a follower and an originator with a broker at any point in the history of their relationship. We count the number of trades that the manager executes as a follower and as an originator with the broker and divide those figures by the total number of trades executed with the broker. Equal-weighted performance is simply the average return for trades made within the window for a manager with a broker across the entire sample. For value-weighted performance, we first compute the trading-volume-weighted return within each large trade event for a follower, and then take the equal-weighted average across each managerbroker pair. Performance figures are displayed in basis points. The NPV is computed at the manager-broker level and is the returns from trades as a follower times the frequency of trading as a follower less the loss from price impact times the frequency of trades as an originator. Here, price impact from followers is taken as the average across specifications of the coefficients on Follower Volume in Table 8 . Panel B displays aggregate estimates of dollar performance on trades as followers and on all trades at the manager-broker-month level. To compute Returns per Dollar Invested, we aggregate dollar performance as a follower and dollar performance on all stocks and then divide these figures by the dollar volume invested as a follower and on all stocks, respectively. For all performance variables, we set a 5-day holding period. To compute the ratio Share of Profits, we aggregate performance on profitable follower trades and all trades and compute the ratio between the two. We limit the focus to profitable trades as interpreting a ratio is not possible when the manager has had either negative returns as a follower, or negative returns overall, or both. This table relates follower imbalances and price impact around 13D filings. We consider each 13D filing in our main specification and aggregate followers' imbalances in the 10 days leading up to the filing, so observations are at the broker-stock-filing level. In Columns 1-4, the dependent variables are the price change from 10 days before to one day before the filing, the price change from one day before to 25 days after the filing, the price change from one day before to one day after the filing and the difference between the price change from 10 days before to one day before and 10 days before and 25 days after the filing, respectively. Each dependent variable is expressed in basis points. We include as independent variable follower imbalances in the 10 days before the 13D filing. To account for magnitude, imbalances have been converted so that coefficients can be interpreted as the effect of a 1/10 th standard deviation increase. T-stats based on robust standard errors, clustered at the manager level, are reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels (***=1%, **=5%, *=10%).
(1) This figure plots the average imbalances for the followers during the large trade events for the stocks involved in the large trades.
